

**The Persistence of Faction
Clinton and Sanders Supporters in the 2018 Gubernatorial Primaries**

Seth Masket
Department of Political Science
University of Denver

seth.masket@du.edu

Abstract

Intraparty factional splits can play out in a competitive nomination contest and sometimes become extremely divisive within a party. To what extent do those factional splits persist to other elections at other levels of government? I examine factional divides in the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination contest between Hillary Clinton Bernie Sanders and examine how that split played out in Democratic gubernatorial nominations in 2017 and 2018, relying on interviews, endorsements, and campaign donation patterns as evidence. The findings suggest substantial factional persistence from one election to the next.

For presentation at the Workshop on Candidates and Competition in American Elections, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University, March 1, 2019. Thanks to Andi Schlut for assistance with data collection.

Please do not cite without permission from author.

Introduction

Judging from some media coverage following the 2016 election, the Democratic Party faced substantial internal divisions that would likely plague it for many years to come. “It’s clear that the party is divided, split on issues including free trade, health care, foreign affairs and Wall Street. They even disagree over the political wisdom of doing deals with Trump,” wrote Philip Elliott (2017). Supporters of 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton and those of her primary rival Bernie Sanders continued to mistrust each other and blame each other for the party’s presidential loss.

Yet both major parties have experienced factionalism and bitter intraparty nomination contests in the past, yet gone onto periods of significant unity in governance and successful election cycles shortly thereafter. Indeed, despite some hard-fought nomination battles in 2018, Democrats enjoyed a great range of successes in that fall’s general elections at the national, state, and local level.

In this paper, I seek to determine just how enduring the Clinton-Sanders divide was in the 2018 election cycle. I do so using two main quantitative data sources: endorsements in the presidential race and in a selection of 2018 gubernatorial races, and campaign spending across the presidential race and gubernatorial primaries in 2017 and 2018. I additionally employ a range of interviews with political activists in early presidential contest states.

Do Factions Persist?

Factionalism is hardly new to the major political parties in the United States. Indeed, the modern parties are currently enjoying a period of relative internal harmony when compared with earlier eras. Southern Democratic delegates walked out of the party’s 1948 national convention rather than approve a civil rights plank, for example, and placed an alternative segregationist

ticket atop the party's ballot. Influential party elites called for the defeat of their own party's presidential ticket in 1964 and 1972. As recently as 2008, a faction of Hillary Clinton supporters called PUMA (People United Means Action, or Party Unity My Ass) threatened to vote Republican in the general election after their preferred candidate was deprived of the Democratic nomination. Today's factionalism has not quite attained such levels.

A Brookings research project (Kamarck and Podkul 2018) examined Democratic party factions peculiar to 2018. The researchers looked at the websites of Democratic U.S. House campaigns, dividing them up between those that referred to their candidate as "progressive" and those that did not (presumed to be "establishment" candidates). The study found that establishment candidates were more likely to prevail in the primary election (35 percent received the nomination, as opposed to 27 percent of progressives who did so), while progressives were somewhat more likely to win the nomination in more conservative districts (presumably because fewer establishment candidates contested those).

Noel (2016) attempts to draw some historical consistency in party factional splits. "What splits parties," he argues, "are rifts between ideologically pure, less compromising members, and more pragmatic, moderate ones. This is a difference not about policy ends but about political means. Not about issues but about strategy. Not about what to do but how we should face the constraints of trying to do it" (p. 167). The strength of these factions and the degree of harmony between them will vary from era to era, but such a divide is useful in describing modern party politics in the United States.

In related work, Noel and Blum (2016) perform a social network analysis on endorsers in multiple presidential elections and are able to identify several different and consistent communities within each party. Democratic communities include the establishment core (who generally get their preferred candidate although failed to do so in 2008), congressional leaders,

New Yorkers, white Southern moderates, labor unions, and so forth. Each of these factions is loyal to the party and stays intensely involved with its presidential nomination process, but in some cycles one may be more or less powerful relative to other factions, while in other cycles the factions may appear relatively unanimous in their support of a candidate. A snapshot of donor address sales in the 2004 presidential cycle showed similar factional splits within the Democratic Party (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2010), with large factions of environmental groups, media organizations, and general interest liberal advocacy organizations competing in nominations but generally cooperating on core party missions.

We see many Democratic presidential nomination contests come down to a struggle between a “regular” (a pragmatic, compromising figure usually favored by many party officeholders and officers) and an “ideologue” (someone who prioritizes ideological purity over compromise and is often popular among more liberal activists, college students, and others). Such regular/ideologue rivalries as those between Walter Mondale and Gary Hart (1984), Bill Clinton and Jerry Brown (1992), Al Gore and Bill Bradley (2000), and John Kerry and Howard Dean (2004) stand as exemplars of this divide.

Indeed, such divisions go back at least as far as the 1960s, when the New Deal coalition was beginning to fray along lines of race, age, class, and attitudes toward war. When the Democratic Party was debating massive reforms in its nomination system in 1970 in the wake of its humiliating 1968 loss, DNC Chairman Larry O’Brien remarked, “We had lost in 1952 and 1956 and remained reasonably united. But in 1970 the bitter divisions of 1968 still existed – hawk versus dove, liberal versus conservative, reformer versus regular – and no reconciliation in sight” (Shafer 1983, 249). Other observers of what would be known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission noted the persistence and the rigidity of the factionalism: “The split of the executive committee appeared to be developing along roughly the same lines as the 1968 division between

the supporters of [Vice President Hubert] Humphrey and those of Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York. One source characterized the fight as ‘an argument between young and old, establishment and innovators, steadfast and antiwar’ elements” (Shafer 1983, 246).

Arguably, the 2016 contest between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders fits within this historical pattern. As with other modern Democratic presidential nominations, a “regular” or “establishment” candidate backed by much of the party’s leadership and officeholders but sometimes criticized for her pragmatic deal-making, squared off against an “ideologue,” widely praised for his ideological consistency but with support largely limited to white progressives and college students. Yet in some ways, this division seemed sharper and more durable than previous ones. Importantly, Sanders performed far better in primary and caucus contests than most earlier ideologue challengers, essentially tying Clinton in Iowa and substantially besting her in New Hampshire.

Additionally, the Sanders wasn’t just running as an ideologue, but also as a populist. This taps into a somewhat older division within the Democratic ranks (Azari and Masket 2018). The Populist Party of the 1890s was largely subsumed into the Democratic coalition, along with its many moralistic appeals about the virtue of rank-and-file party members and the corruption of wealthy insiders and elites (Gerring 2001; Hicks 1961; Postel 2007). William Gibbs McAdoo exploited these populist sentiments in his presidential nomination campaign against Al Smith in 1924. While he failed to secure the presidential nomination, McAdoo’s claim that he had the “mandate of the people” helped polarize his party internally and likely contributed to his party’s loss in the fall (Azari and Masket 2018; Murray 1976). The 2016 Sanders campaign can be seen as an adaptation of McAdoo’s approach.

A main question for this paper is whether the factional split in one contest maps onto another one. For example, just as the 2016 presidential election was coming to an end, the 2017

Virginia gubernatorial election was beginning to heat up. That contest saw a fiercely competitive Democratic primary between Rep. Tom Perriello and Lieutenant Governor Ralph Northam. Bernie Sanders, and the Our Revolution organization closely tied to him, endorsed Perriello, while many party establishment figures backed Northam, who prevailed in the June primary election. But to what extent did Democratic activists follow their patterns from 2016? Did the Sanders/Clinton divide hold for another nomination for another office?

Methodology

Qualitative

I first examined this question through a series of interviews with Democratic Party activists in New Hampshire, Iowa, South Carolina, and Nevada. As the four states with traditionally the earliest presidential primaries and caucuses, these are the places the presidential candidates visit the most and whose activists are most attuned to the dynamics of party nomination contests. I have conducted interviews with 60 activists since in the spring of 2017 (Masket forthcoming).

Among the questions I've asked these respondents is the degree to which party splits from 2016 map on to midterm contests in 2018, especially gubernatorial primaries. Importantly, many respondents rejected the idea, suggesting that the contests and candidates were sufficiently different from year to year that factional splits didn't really survive from one contest to the next. However, some felt that the ongoing factionalism was important. A Nevada state senator, for example, argued, "I think what we're seeing play out is a fight for where the Democratic party in Nevada wants to go. Are we a more moderate party? Are we a more liberal, progressive party? And I think the gubernatorial primary is the manifestation of that." A Nevada Democratic party official agreed, "Chris [Giunchigliani] has all the Clinton people and all, Chris G. is the one that

can build bridges between Clinton and Bernie. In other words, no Bernie person would ever vote for Steve Sisolak, and a lot of Hillary people would vote for Chris G.”

A longstanding Democratic campaign worker in Des Moines sized up the 2018 Iowa gubernatorial candidates in terms of their presidential loyalties:

So Kathy Glasson is the Bernie person. Nate Boulton is the Obama, and Andy McGuire is the Hillary. And then it’s John Norris, who had a role in the Obama administration, from a rural part of Iowa. He’s like the rational kind of Democrats, who are any, whether they were Bernie, whether they were Hillary or Obama, he’s like that person where the sane Democrats go, that’s what I like to say.

A Sanders campaign staffer in Iowa conceded an anti-Sanders bias among many party regulars, as evidenced by comments on the party’s Facebook page:

There are comments that we all make like, “Oh, they’re a Bernie Bro.” I still hear that... I find myself doing that too sometimes and I dismiss people who are in that position that I classify as kind of a Bernie Bro, in my mind, which isn’t... I know that's not right to do and that’s not a good policy thing to do or to build their party, but I know that happens all the time, still. They’re a Bernie person, so that means just dismiss them, they’re crazy, kind of thing, instead of working together on a common issue. But yeah, that's something I’ve noticed a lot, is where we’re still so divided.

A veteran South Carolina Democratic activist said that her assessment of the presidential campaigns affects how she perceives other candidates and volunteers going forward: “I don’t like the Bernie people. Just because he won’t say he’s a Democrat, that makes me mad at everybody who supports him.”

Quantitative

The interview evidence suggests that in at least some cases, the Democrats 2016 intraparty divisions lived on and affected nominations in 2017 and 2018. But it's one thing for political actors to claim that such divisions persist; do we see such persistence in their actions and political decisions?

I began to test this with a study of endorsements of candidates in nomination contests. Endorsements have generally been considered a reliable indicator of activist and party preferences. They were a primary component of the analysis of *The Party Decides* (Cohen et al. 2008) and have been used by numerous news sources to intuit support for various candidates (e.g.: FiveThirtyEight 2016).

For this analysis, I collected endorsements from state legislators, local elected officials, and interest group leaders who backed a presidential candidate prior to the Iowa Caucuses in 2016, and then looked to see how they endorsed in the crowded 2018 gubernatorial Democratic primary in that state. I identified a total of 58 such people who were active in both nomination cycles. A quick study suggests why this isn't necessarily the most profitable tool for examining factionalism. As Table 1 shows, there just aren't that many endorsers to study; most people who endorse in one year don't endorse in the next. And Bernie Sanders, in particular, had very few prominent endorsements at all.

Backers of Martin O'Malley overwhelmingly endorsed state Senator Nate Boulton, following the endorsement of O'Malley himself, and 10 of Clinton's 36 endorsers backed Boulton, as well. Boulton, indeed, seemed to be the overwhelming party favorite, until allegations of sexual assault surfaced a few weeks before the primary election. Most of Clinton's backers went with businessman Fred Hubble, who would win the nomination. But again, the lack of significant endorsements for Sanders, who nonetheless accrued so many votes and donations

and nearly prevailed in the 2016 caucus, makes the endorsement route a challenging one for examining factionalism.

Table 1: Endorsements for Democratic Presidential Candidates in 2016 and Iowa Gubernatorial Candidates in 2018

<u>Gubernatorial Endorsement in 2018</u>	<u>Presidential Endorsement in 2016</u>			
	<u>Biden</u>	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>O'Malley</u>	<u>Sanders</u>
Nate Boulton	1	10	13	0
Cathy Glasson	0	1	0	1
Fred Hubble	0	16	1	1
Andy McGuire	0	5	0	0
John Norris	0	4	4	1

Instead of relying on endorsements, I performed a more systematic analysis of campaign donation patterns across the two election cycles. I focused my analysis on the 33 states that had Democratic gubernatorial primary elections in 2017 and 2018. I have excluded California from this analysis due to the unusual nature of its top-two election system, which is functionally different from a party primary election. For each of the states, I gathered complete records of donations to Democrats presidential candidates prior to the state’s presidential primary or caucus in 2016. I then gathered complete records of donations to Democratic gubernatorial candidates prior to the primaries in 2017 (New Jersey and Virginia) and 2018 (31 other states).¹

I was particularly interested in using campaign finance records to deduce party preferences in these nomination contests. I therefore gathered complete records of donations to state formal party committees in 2016 and 2018 in the 33 races under study. Adapting an approach from Hassell (2018), I matched all the donors who had contributed both to a party committee and to a gubernatorial primary candidate in 2017-18. This turns out to be a fairly high threshold for

¹ Campaign finance data were made available by the National Institute on Money in Politics (followthemoney.org).

donors. There were some 354,646 donations recorded to Democratic gubernatorial candidates in the primaries under study, but only 25,602 donations to party committees in those states. Of these, just 7,362 donors contributed to both a party committee and a Democratic gubernatorial candidate. As Hassell notes, those who donate to both a party committee and a candidate (*candidate-and-committee donors*) are a good indicator of the overall party's allegiances.

Table A1 (see appendix) displays the overall number of candidate-and-committee donors who contributed to each gubernatorial candidate in the primary. Indeed, the number of such donations received by the candidates turns out to be a robust predictor of their successes in the nomination contest. Of the 33 contest winners, 27 had received the plurality of candidate-and-committee donations. Among the six cases where the donor choice did not receive the nomination, two were cases in which the plurality recipient did not reach a majority, and which might be considered unusual cases for other reasons. In Colorado, for example, Cary Kennedy received 44 percent of these donations, but lost the nomination to Jared Polis, a multi-millionaire who largely self-financed during the contest, and party support was split as a result (Frank and Weber 2018). Iowa, meanwhile, saw a large field of primary candidates and no clear party consensus, and, as noted above, the plurality donor choice ended up withdrawing from the race shortly before the primary election when allegations of sexual misconduct surfaced (Boshart 2018). The number of candidate-and-committee donors is a modestly more successful predictor of nomination success than the total amount contributed by these donors, which only predicts the nominee in 25 of the 33 cases. For the purposes of this analysis, I treat the recipient of the plurality of candidate-and-committee donations as the party's choice in the nomination contest.

Table A1 Here

I next investigate whether donor patterns in 2016 predict similar patterns in 2018. Across the 32 states under study,² 330,897 people donated to the Democratic presidential candidates of 2016 prior to their state’s primary or caucus. Only 24,792 people contributed to both a 2016 presidential nomination candidate and a 2017-18 gubernatorial nomination candidate. I am just examining this subset of presidential-and-gubernatorial donors here, excluding donations made by the presidential candidates themselves.

Table 2 offers some insight here, showing some simple means of the percentage of people who donated to 2016 Democratic presidential candidates and how they donated in the 2017-18 gubernatorial primaries. (The total number of donors in each category is shown in parentheses.) As the table shows, the overwhelming number of contributors to 2016 presidential candidates chose between Clinton and Sanders, which is hardly surprising since Jim Webb dropped out in the fall of 2015 and O’Malley withdrew shortly after the Iowa caucuses. As the second column shows, supporters of Hillary Clinton were somewhat more likely to support the party’s choice in a gubernatorial primary than supporters of Bernie Sanders were, 68.5% to 53.3%.

Table 2 – Percentage Donating to Party Choice in 2017-18, by Presidential Support in 2016

2016 presidential <u>candidate</u>	All 2018 gubernatorial <u>primaries</u>	Primaries in which the party made <u>majority choice</u>	Primaries in which the party was <u>divided</u>
Clinton	68.5% (11,295)	80.0% (8,339)	81.7% (5,045)
Sanders	53.3% (12,871)	53.7% (9,592)	30.6% (6,413)
O’Malley	42.8% (428)	42.6% (343)	63.2% (155)
Webb	87.8% (90)	93.8% (81)	94.5% (73)

Differences in these levels of support grow substantially when we omit those gubernatorial races where the party failed to provide majority donor support for any single

² I have omitted New York from this portion of the analysis due to some data collection challenges. I will incorporate these data in subsequent iterations of this paper. This omission likely biases the results slightly in the direction of greater party elite strength, given that the bulk of candidate-and-committee donors in New York preferred Cynthia Nixon for the Democratic nomination and she nonetheless lost to Andrew Cuomo.

candidate (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and Wisconsin), as shown in the third column. In those remaining states, there is now roughly a 26-point gap between supporters of Clinton and Sanders, with the former supporting the party's gubernatorial choice 80% of the time and the latter doing so only 54% of the time.

The differences become far more stark when we limit the analysis those cases where there were conflicting factional signals. In the fourth column, I have just examined those cases in which Our Revolution, the Sanders-affiliated advocacy group, endorsed a different gubernatorial candidate than the party donors' choice.³ There were seven of these contests – Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Virginia. In just these states, Clinton supporters donated to the party's gubernatorial choice 82% of the time, while Sanders supporters did so around 31% of the time – a more than fifty-point gap.

I run a more sophisticated logistic analysis of these differences, depicted in Table A2. In each of these, I predict the likelihood that a donor will support the party's choice for gubernatorial nominee. The main predictor is their previous support for a presidential candidate. I run each model with a Clinton dummy (Clinton vs. all other candidates) and then with a Sanders dummy. I also control for the size of the donor's median presidential donation in 2016, as well as the number of donations made in gubernatorial contests in 2017 and 2018.

Table A2 here

The results offer strong support for the idea of persistent divisiveness among party donors. The presidential candidate coefficients are highly statistically significant and in the expected direction, with Clinton supporters far more likely than Sanders supporters to back the party's choice in a 2017-18 gubernatorial primary. These differences again become more

³ <https://ourrevolution.com/results/>

prominent when the party has made a clearer choice in the gubernatorial contest, and starker still when the party's choice is opposed by an Our Revolution-backed candidate.

We can see a few examples of these divisive primaries. In Massachusetts, party donors picked Jay Gonzales, while Our Revolution endorsed Robert Massie. 82 percent of Clinton supporters ended up contributing to Gonzales, while 68 percent of Sanders supporters gave to Massie. In Virginia, 62% of Clinton backers gave to the party's choice, Ralph Northam, while 61% of Sanders backers gave to the Our Revolution choice, Tom Perriello. In Michigan, 79% of Clinton backers donated to the party-backed Gretchen Whitmer, while 77% of Sanders supporters contributed to the Our Revolution-backed Abdul El-Sayed.

All this raises the question of the importance of the Our Revolution endorsement. Does that signal of difference from the mainstream Democratic Party cause donors to shift their alliances in Our Revolution's direction? Or is Our Revolution simply choosing to back those candidates who already seem to have a substantial base of support distinct from the party's choice?

I investigate this in Table 3 by breaking down the donation records so that we can examine divisiveness both before and after the Our Revolution endorsement. As the table suggests, there are already pretty substantial divisions before Our Revolution gives any public statement, with Clinton supporters donating to the party's choice in the gubernatorial primary 83% of the time but Sanders supporters doing so only 42% of the time. But that difference becomes far greater after the endorsement, with a difference of 77 to 19 percent – a nearly sixty-point gap. The evidence here suggests that Our Revolution tended to insert itself in a race only when there was already substantial support for someone other than the party's favorite, but that their activity tended to boost support for such a candidate.

Table 3 – Percentage Donating to Party Choice in 2017-18, by Presidential Support in 2016 before and after Our Revolution Endorsement


<u>2016 presidential candidate</u>	<u>Prior to Our Revolution endorsement</u>	<u>After Our Revolution endorsement</u>
Clinton	83.3% (3,619)	77.3% (1,426)
Sanders	42.2% (3,217)	18.8% (3,197)

These findings are backed up by a more sophisticated logit analysis, depicted in Table A3. The setup here is essentially the same as in the rightmost two columns in Table A2, except that I have added a dummy variable for when Our Revolution declared its support for a gubernatorial candidate and then interacted that variable with the presidential candidate one. Again, Sanders supporters move strongly away from the party’s choice once the Our Revolution position is known, while Clinton supporters move strongly toward it.

Table A3 about here

I translate these logit results into predicted probabilities in Figure 1. These results are close to those in Table 3. Prior to the Our Revolution endorsement, Clinton backers had a 90 percent likelihood of contributing to their party’s preferred gubernatorial candidate, while Sanders backers only had a 58 percent likelihood. After the Our Revolution message was disseminated, the Clinton likelihood dropped modestly to 79 percent, while the Sanders likelihood dropped to 18 percent. What was a 42-point difference between factions grew to a 61-point gap.

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Clinton and Sanders Supporters Donating to Party Choice in Gubernatorial Primary, Derived from Logit Analysis



One question left unanswered by the above analysis is the extent to which the Clinton/Sanders divide was the *cause* of subsequent divisions, or whether those divisions preclude the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination. Generally speaking, are those who support the “ideologue” candidate in one nomination contest likely to be the same ones backing the ideologue in subsequent contests? Are Howard Dean backers, for example, the same people as Bernie Sanders backers?

I am unable to address this question in the very long term. But in a shorter time window, it is possible to compare the donation patterns in some gubernatorial primaries in 2018 with those from four years earlier, prior to the Clinton/Sanders rivalry. For example, the states of New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, which saw competitive Democratic gubernatorial

primaries in 2018, also saw such competition in their 2014 races. To what extent do donations in one race predict the other?

Tables 4A through 4C offer a bit of insight on this. The first shows the breakdown of the donors common to both the 2014 and 2018 gubernatorial Democratic primaries in New York. There were notable similarities between these two contests, with Andrew Cuomo playing the role of the party regular, and a progressive reformer (Zephyr Teachout in 2014, Cynthia Nixon in 2018) challenging him from the left, in both. And indeed the donation patterns were strikingly similar. Cuomo retained nearly 100% of his donors from four years earlier, while over 99% of Teachout's donors from 2014 went to Nixon in 2018.

The patterns aren't quite so stark in the Massachusetts elections. There, party favorite Martha Coakley dominated donations and the primary in 2014, and 87% of her support went to party favorite and nominee Jay Gonzales in 2018. Indeed, Gonzales took the majority of donors from all three candidates from four years earlier, although not as strongly as he did from Coakley's supporters. Only 65% of progressive reformer Donald Berwick's supporters from 2014, for example, went Gonzales' way four years later.

Persistent donor patterns are even less in evidence in the Rhode Island contests. The 2014 Democratic gubernatorial primary there was split four ways, but donors between the two years overwhelmingly backed incumbent Gina Raimondo for nomination in 2018. The Our Revolution-backed Matthew Brown claimed no more than 5% of the donors from any of the candidates from four years earlier.

Table 4A - New York Gubernatorial Democratic Primaries

<u>2018 Candidate</u>	<u>Cuomo '14</u>	<u>Teachout '14</u>
Cuomo '18	1,233 (99%)	1 (1%)
Nixon '18	11 (1%)	467 (99%)

Table 4B – Massachusetts Gubernatorial Democratic Primaries

<u>2018 Candidate</u>	<u>Berwick '14</u>	<u>Coakley '14</u>	<u>Grossman '14</u>
Gonzales '18	173 (65%)	218 (87%)	134 (79%)
Massie '18	95 (35%)	32 (13%)	36 (21%)

Table 4C – Rhode Island Gubernatorial Democratic Primaries

<u>2018 Candidate</u>	<u>Giroux '14</u>	<u>Pell '14</u>	<u>Raimondo '14</u>	<u>Taveras '14</u>
Brown '18	0 (0%)	2 (5%)	10 (1%)	16 (5%)
Raimondo '18	0 (0%)	36 (95%)	2,587 (99%)	292 (95%)

Discussion

The findings presented above, both qualitative and quantitative, suggest that intraparty factional patterns persist from one election to the next, even from national to state-level elections, to a substantial degree. These patterns become more apparent when party factions communicate clear signals of difference, such as consistent party donors leaning toward one candidate and the “ideologue” faction publicly endorsing another.

This study, of course, relies on a limited set of candidates and only covers one time period. It doesn't give us a basis to say whether the Clinton/Sanders divide is more or less potent than, say, the Clinton/Obama divide from 2008, or the Kerry/Dean divide from 2004. But the examination of 2014 and 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primaries suggests that there is some durability to these factions that precedes the Clinton/Sanders contest, and arguably structured it.

The suggestion is that Democrats at the national and state level tend to be arrayed along the lines of durable factional groups, although the data here cannot determine the age of those factions.

It is also far from certain just how long we should expect these divisions to last. In updates to this paper, I intend to gather financial records from 2019 to see how the 2016 presidential donation patterns apply to the ongoing Democratic presidential nomination. But it seems reasonable to conjecture that as that field narrows, it will do so roughly along factional lines, with party “regulars” leaning toward one or a narrow group of traditional Democrats and others converging on Bernie Sanders or someone with a similar campaigning style or set of policy beliefs.

At the very least, though, this paper suggests that candidates and campaigns, whether at the national or state level, do not go into a nomination contest with a clean slate and get to decide how to position themselves. Important factions precede them and will determine to no small extent how that contest is shaped.

References

- Azari, Julia R., and Seth Masket. 2018. “‘The Mandate of the People’: The 2016 Sanders Campaign in Context.” In *The State of the Parties, 2018: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Political Parties*, , 75–83.
- Blum, Rachel, and Hans Noel. 2016. “Presidential Nominations and Coalition Politics: Detecting Party Factions In Network Data.” In *Southern Political Science Association*, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Boshart, Rod. 2018. “Nate Boulton Suspends Campaign for Governor.” *The Courier*. https://wfcourier.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/update-nate-boulton-suspends-campaign-for-governor/article_8b1582e0-4399-5636-8a7f-6b25ce914c0a.html (January 25, 2019).
- Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides : Presidential Nominations before and after Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- FiveThirtyEight. 2016. “The 2016 Endorsement Primary.” *FiveThirtyEight.com*. <https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-endorsement-primary/>.
- Frank, John, and Natalie Weber. 2018. “Jared Polis Wins Democratic Primary for Colorado Governor.” *The Denver Post*. <https://www.denverpost.com/2018/06/26/colorado-democratic-primary-governor-2018/> (January 25, 2019).
- Gerring, John. 2001. *Party Ideologies in America, 1828 - 1996*. Reprinted. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Hassell, Hans J. G. 2018. *The Party’s Primary: Control of Congressional Nominations*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hicks, John Donald. 1961. “The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party.” https://www.amazon.com/Populist-Revolt-History-Farmers-Alliance/dp/0313225672/ref=sr_1_fkmrnull_1?keywords=hicks+the+populist+revolt&qid=1549922365&s=books&sr=1-1-fkmrnull (February 11, 2019).
- Kamarck, Elaine, and Alexander Podkul. 2018. *The Primaries Project at Brookings*. The Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/series/the-primaries-project-midterms-2018/>.
- Koger, Gregory, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel. 2010. “Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics.” *American Politics Research* 38: 33–53.
- Masket, Seth. forthcoming. *Learning from Loss: The Democrats 2016-2020*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Murray, Robert K. 1976. *The 103rd Ballot: Democrats and the Disaster in Madison Square Garden*. 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Noel, Hans. 2016. "Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667(1): 166–88.

Philip, Elliott. 2017. "A Divided Democratic Party Debates Its Future." *Time*.
<http://time.com/4951191/divided-democratic-party-debates-its-future/> (February 1, 2019).

Postel, Charles. 2007. *The Populist Vision*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Publisher description <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0723/2006051396-d.html>.

Shafer, Byron E. 1983. *Quiet Revolution : The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Table A1 – Gubernatorial Candidates and Party Donations

<u>State</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Number of candidate- and-committee donors</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Number of candidate- and-committee donors</u>
AL	Cobb	4 (20.0)	IL	Biss	74 (67.3)
	Countryman	1 (5.0)		Daiber	5 (4.5)
	Fields	0 (0.0)		Hardiman	0 (0.0)
	Maddox	15 (75.0)		Kennedy	25 (22.7)
	White	0 (0.0)		Marshall	0 (0.0)
AR	Henderson	3 (75.0)		Pritzker	6 (5.5)
	Sanders	1 (25.0)		Anderson	0 (0)
AZ	Farley	64 (29.8)	KS	Bergeson	0 (0.0)
	Fryer	3 (1.4)		Brewer	0 (0.0)
	Garcia	148 (68.8)		Kelly	0 (0.0)
CO	Johnston	99 (16.6)		Svaty	0 (0.0)
	Kennedy	279 (46.8)	MA	Gonzalez	111 (91.0)
	Lynne	60 (10.1)		Massie	11 (9.0)
	Polis	158 (26.5)	MD	Baker	39 (12.8)
CT	Ganim	4 (20.0)		Ervin	1 (0.3)
	Lamont	16 (80.0)		Jealous	200 (65.6)
FL	Gillum	230 (48.1)		Madaleno	26 (8.5)
	Graham	203 (42.5)		Ross	24 (7.9)
	Greene	0 (0.0)		Shea	14 (4.6)
	King	15 (3.1)		Vignarajah	1 (0.3)
	Levine	30 (6.3)	ME	Cote	65 (21.4)
	Lundmark	0 (0.0)		Dion, D	0 (0.0)
	Wetherbee	0 (0.0)		Dion, M	7 (2.3)
GA	Abrams	142 (80.7)		Eves	73 (24.0)
	Evans	34 (19.3)		Mills	97 (31.9)
HI	Carvalho	0 (0.0)	Russell	14 (4.6)	
	Hanabusa	16 (44.4)	Sweet	48 (15.8)	
	Ige	20 (55.6)	MI	El-Sayed	177 (38.1)
IA	Boulton	188 (31.8)		Thanedar	1 (0.2)
	Glasson	115 (19.4)	Whitmer	286 (61.6)	
	Hubbell	162 (27.4)	MN	Murphy	5 (23.8)
	McGuire	40 (6.8)		Savior	0 (0.0)
	Norris	86 (14.5)		Swanson	1 (4.8)
	Wilburn	1 (0.2)		Walz	15 (71.4)
ID	Balukoff	0 (0.0)	NE	Davis	0 (0.0)
	Dill	0 (0.0)		Krist	5 (100)
	Jordan	11 (100.0)	NH	Marchand	70 (100)

State	Candidate	Number of candidate-and-committee donors		State	Candidate	Number of candidate-and-committee donors	
NJ	Brennan	0	(0.0)	VT	Ehlers	2	(18.2)
	Johnson	7	(9.6)		Hallquist	6	(54.5)
	Lesniak	2	(2.7)		Siegel	2	(18.2)
	McGreevey	1	(1.4)		Sonneborn	1	(9.1)
	Murphy	60	(82.2)		Evers	444	(41.3)
	Wisniewski	3	(4.1)		Flynn	47	(4.4)
NM	Apodaca	24	(4.0)	Gronik	60	(5.6)	
	Cervantes	16	(2.7)	McCabe	82	(7.6)	
	Grisham	557	(93.3)	Mitchell	72	(6.7)	
NV	Giunchigliani	37	(56.9)	WI	Pade	1	(0.1)
	Sisolak	28	(43.1)		Roys	122	(11.3)
	Thorns	0	(0.0)		Soglin	4	(0.4)
NY	Cuomo	284	(26.2)		Vinehout	110	(10.2)
	Nixon	801	(73.8)		Wachs	134	(12.5)
OH	Cordray	212	(70.0)		WY	Throne	5
	Kucinich	43	(14.2)	Wilde		0	(0.0)
	O'Neill	0	(0.0)				
	Schiavoni	48	(15.8)				
OK	Edmonson	11	(84.6)				
	Johnson	2	(15.4)				
OR	Brown	189	(100)				
	Jones	0	(0.0)				
	Neville	0	(0.0)				
RI	Brown	3	(1.8)				
	Dickinson	0	(0.0)				
	Raimondo	160	(98.2)				
SC	Noble	6	(20.0)				
	Smith	23	(76.7)				
	Willis	1	(3.3)				
TN	Dean	36	(62.1)				
	Fitzhugh	22	(37.9)				
TX	Davis	0	(0.0)				
	Mumbach	0	(0.0)				
	Ocegueda	0	(0.0)				
	Payne	0	(0.0)				
	Valdez	5	(100)				
	Wakely	0	(0.0)				
	White	0	(0.0)				
VA	Northam	100	(75.2)				
	Perriello	33	(24.8)				

Notes: Percentages of candidate-and-committee donors appear in parentheses. Nomination winners appear in bold face.

Table A2 - Logit Model: Likelihood of Donating to Party's Choice in Democratic Gubernatorial Primary by Support for Presidential Candidate in 2016

<u>Variables</u>	All cases		When the party has decided		When the party is divided	
	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>Sanders</u>	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>Sanders</u>	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>Sanders</u>
Presidential candidate	0.619*** (0.032)	-0.538*** (0.032)	1.274*** (0.041)	-1.126*** (0.041)	2.263*** (0.053)	-2.344*** (0.054)
Median presidential donation	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)
Number of gubernatorial donations	0.018*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.082 (0.286)	0.501 (0.285)	-0.549 (0.293)	0.662* (0.290)	-2.207*** (0.095)	-0.004 (0.094)
N	23,803	23,803	17,503	17,503	11,686	11,686
Groups	26	26	21	21	7	7
Log Likelihood	-13951.5	-13996.9	-9447.5	-9552.8	-5932.0	-5866.1

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood of donating to the party's preferred candidate in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 2017 or 2018. Cell entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Model is fixed effects, controlling for states (state coefficients not depicted here). Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$).

Table A3 - Logit Model: Likelihood of Donating to Party's Choice in Democratic Gubernatorial Primary by Support for Presidential Candidate in 2016, with Our Revolution Endorsement

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Donated to Sanders</u>	<u>Donated to Clinton</u>
Presidential candidate	-1.922*** (0.0681)	1.803*** (0.0672)
After Our Revolution endorsement	-0.664*** (0.0834)	-1.489*** (0.0611)
Pres. Candidate × After Our Rev. endorsement	-0.804*** (0.101)	0.911*** (0.102)
Median presidential donation	-0.00021*** (0.000)	-0.00018*** (0.000)
Number of gubernatorial donations	0.0206*** (0.00271)	0.0196*** (0.00265)
Constant	-0.175 (0.095)	-1.960*** (0.095)
N	11,687	11,687
Groups	7	7
Log Likelihood	-5552.9	-5604.2

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood of donating to the party's preferred candidate in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 2017 or 2018. Cell entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Model is fixed effects, controlling for states (state coefficients not depicted here). Data are limited to the seven states in which the party donor-preferred candidate was different from the Our Revolution-endorsed candidate (IA, MA, MI, OH, OK, RI, VA). Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$).